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ABSTRACT: Profiling through predictive data mining has already found 
its way onto the security agenda of the European Union (EU). This 
technique, designed to allow for the automatic flagging of individuals 
allegedly deserving ‘further attention’, is increasingly being developed, 
supported, and even implemented (typically, in the name of counter-
terrorism) – but with extremely limited publicity. The debate on the risks 
to fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals posed by profiling has 
been sidelined, with worrying implications. This paper summarises a 
number of key points that are relevant for a much-needed discussion of 
the challenges ahead. 
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* 
rofiling through predictive data mining is already a reality worldwide, including in the 
European Union (EU). This modern technique relies on the massive processing of 
personal data in order to identify patterns that allow for the automatic categorisation of 
individuals.
1 Widely used in the private sector, profiling is now also increasingly being 
portrayed as a useful, appropriate technique for various security-related purposes – also by the 
EU institutions.
2 While this is happening, no satisfactory debate is taking place on how the use 
of profiling in this particular area can encroach upon the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals. 
1. Understanding  profiling 
There is much confusion about the very essence of the technique, and a degree of 
misinformation on the subject persists. This is partly due to the multiple meanings of the term 
                                                      
* Gloria González Fuster is a researcher at the Law, Science, Technology & Society (LSTS) Research 
Group of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), Serge Gutwirth is a professor at the VUB and chairman of 
VUB’s LSTS and Erika Ellyne is a researcher at VUB’s LSTS.   
1 For a general discussion of profiling and the related legal challenges, see Lee A. Bygrave (2001), 
“Minding the machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling”, 
Computer Law & Security Report, No. 17, pp.  17-24; Jean-Marc Dinant, Christophe Lazaro, Yves 
Poullet, Nathalie Lefever and Antoinette Rouvroy (2008), Application of Convention 108 to the profiling 
mechanism: Some ideas for the future work of the consultative committee (T-PD), Expert report for the 
Consultative Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, 11 January, Strasbourg; and Mireille Hildebrandt and 
Serge Gutwirth (eds) (2008), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross disciplinary perspectives, Dordrecht: 
Springer Science. 
2 For instance, the Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy 
(known as ‘The Future Group’) envisioned in its 2008 report “an increasingly connected world in which 
public security organizations will have access to almost limitless amounts of potentially useful 
information” and asked member states to prioritise investment in “technologies that enable automated 
data analysis” (Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy 
(‘The Future Group’) (2008), Freedom, Security, Privacy: European Home Affairs in an open world, 
Report, June, p. 43). Preparatory documents on the Stockholm programme argued that routine data 
monitoring and analysis should increasingly be handled by machines, and that the systems should flag up 
exceptions (unusual behaviour and anomalies) for human investigation. Progress was expected in three 
main areas: developing ‘intelligent’ responses for the monitoring of a single data stream (for instance, 
through CCTV); developing ‘intelligent’ responses for monitoring across multiple data streams, including 
streams of multiple types (for instance, simultaneous monitoring through CCTV and telecommunications 
monitoring); and progress in the type of interactions between the monitoring and humans (for instance, 
issuing certain types of alerts instead of simply ‘flags’) (Portuguese Presidency of the European Union 
(2007),  Public security, privacy and technology in Europe: Moving forward: Concept paper on the 
European strategy to transform Public security organizations in a Connected World, October, p. 10). 
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‘profiling’.
3 The word is nevertheless commonly used in contemporary security-related 
discussions as referring to the use of predictive data mining
4 to establish recurrent patterns or 
‘profiles’ permitting the classification of individuals into different categories. Conceptually, it 
covers a double process: a first analysis of data to look for seemingly relevant patterns, and a 
second examination to identify the items that correspond to the patterns. When applied in the 
context of security, profiling is generally used to select a group of people, objects, or actions 
considered as ‘deserving further attention’
5 or ‘special treatment’.
6 
Graphically speaking, profiling is not like looking for a needle in a haystack. It is more like 
collecting information on all the pieces in that haystack, storing the data and analysing it in 
order to elaborate a profile of something that is yet unknown, but perceived as a possible risk. If 
the procedure goes well, the obtained ‘profile’ should consist of a series of features such as 
‘uncommonly small’, ‘uncommonly hard’, ‘uncommonly sharp’. Next, the procedure requires 
using the collected information again to compare the obtained ‘profile’ with the features of all 
the existing pieces. Those that are extraordinarily small, hard or sharp should be flagged as 
‘potentially risky’, and one of the flagged pieces could be the needle in the haystack. 
Profiling produces non-representational knowledge. Profiles do not describe reality, but are 
detected by the aggregation, mining and cleansing of data. They are based on correlations that 
cannot be equated with causes or reasons without further inquiry; they are probabilistic 
knowledge. That means that even if a pattern appears to occur each time certain conditions are 
met, it is not absolutely sure that it will occur again in the future. Based on experience, an 
animal may associate a situation with danger as a result of the recognition of a certain pattern 
and act consistently, even if the situation, in reality, is not a dangerous one: the human scent and 
the shuffling footsteps were not those of a bloodthirsty hunter, but those of an animal rights 
observer.
7 
As a matter of fact, profiling implies a shift from searching and measuring towards detecting: 
while more classical statistical approaches aim at validating or invalidating proposed 
correlations believed to be pertinent answers to existing questions, with profiling there are no 
preliminary questions. The correlations as such become the ‘pertinent’ information, triggering 
questions and suppositions. The result is that the tracing of behaviour becomes the source of an 
                                                      
3 Ethnic profiling, for instance, refers to the use of ethnic or related features as discriminating criteria to 
classify individuals and treat them differently (on the possible overlap of the problems caused by ethnic 
profiling and profiling through predictive data mining, see Wim Schreurs, Mireille Hildebrandt, Els Kindt 
and Michaël Vanfleteren (2008), “Cogitas, Ergo Sum: The Role of Data Protection Law and Non-
discrimination Law in Group Profiling in the Private Sector”, in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth 
(eds), Profiling the European Citizen: Cross disciplinary perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer Science, pp. 
241-270. The term ‘profiles’ is sometimes used to refer to plain descriptions of characteristics considered 
as describing individuals deserving reinforced attention; a measure discussed in 2002 at the level of the 
Council of the EU went in this direction on the possible definition of ‘terrorist profiles’ to be used in 
European counter-terrorism efforts.  
4 In this sense, D.J. Solove (2008), “Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate”, The University of 
Chicago Law Review, No. 75, pp. 343-362; or Daniel J. Steinbock (2005), “Data Matching, Data Mining, 
and Due Process”, Georgia Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 1-86. 
5 Kim Taipale (2007), “The Privacy Implications of Government Data Mining Programs”, Testimony 
before the US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 10 January, p. 6.  
6 David Lyon (ed.) (2003), Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk and Digital Discrimination, New 
York: Routledge, p. 20. 
7 Serge S. Gutwirth and Paul De Hert (2008), “Regulating profiling in a democratic constitutional state”, 
in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European citizen: Cross disciplinary 
perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer Science, pp. 271-291. 3 
almost unlimited network of possible profiling practices generating knowledge with an impact 
upon individuals.
8 
2.  Relevance at EU level 
The best example of the EU’s support for this type of practice is perhaps Directive 2005/60/EC 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (generally referred to as the ‘Third Money Laundering Directive’).
9 Adopted 
in 2005, the Directive aimed at improving the detection of suspicious financial flows, and 
extended the obligation to report on suspicious transactions beyond financial institutions.
10 
Crucially, it brought about the application of a risk-based approach to customer due diligence 
for the ongoing monitoring of transaction activities, and obliged member states to require that 
the designated bodies (i.e. banks, auditors, notaries, etc.) establish policies and procedures of 
risk assessment to forestall and prevent money laundering or terrorist financing.
11 The 
designated bodies must report any suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing obtained 
through such procedures to their respective national authorities, which will consequently take 
the appropriate follow-up measures.  
Currently, EU institutions are discussing the creation of an EU-wide system designed to use for 
profiling the personal information of people travelling by air – more concretely, of all 
passengers travelling by air from EU territory to a third country and vice versa. The official 
exchange of views on this initiative started in 2007, when the European Commission adopted as 
a counter-terrorism measure a proposal concerning a common EU approach on the use of air 
passenger data (‘Passenger Name Records’, or ‘PNR’) for law enforcement purposes.
12 
According to that proposal, the personal data of passengers was to be processed and shared 
among all member states in order to “fulfil the purpose of developing risk indicators and 
establishing patterns of travel and behaviour”.
13 Since then, the European Commission has 
refused to label this activity as a profiling activity, but others have,
14 notably taking into account 
                                                      
8 Serge Gutwirth and Mireille Hildebrandt (2010), “Some Caveats on Profiling”, in Serge Gutwirth, Yves 
Poullet and Paul De Hert (eds), Data protection in a profiled world, Dordrecht: Springer Science, to be 
published in June 2010, p. 11 of current manuscript. 
9 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 309, 25.11.2005, pp. 15–36. 
10 The provisions of the Directive apply to credit institutions, financial institutions, and a series of legal or 
natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities (auditors, external accountants and 
tax advisors; notaries and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether by acting 
on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction, or by assisting in the planning 
or execution of transactions for their client concerning the: (i) buying and selling of real property or 
business entities; (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (iii) opening or management of 
bank, savings or securities accounts; (iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, 
operation or management of companies; (v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or 
similar structures; (c) trust or company service providers; real estate agents; other natural or legal persons 
trading in goods, only to the extent that payments are made in cash in an amount of EUR 15,000 or more, 
whether the transaction is executed in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked; 
and casinos (Art. 2(1) of Directive 2005/60/EC). 
11 See Art. 34(1) of Directive 2005/60/EC. 
12 European Commission (2007), Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, COM(2007) 654 final, 6.11.2007, Brussels. 
13 Ibid., p. 10. 
14 Sarah Ludford (2008), Working Document on the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity 
and race, in counter-terrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control, Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, 30 September, p. 4.  4 
that the aim of the system would be to identify certain categories of passengers as ‘high-risk 
passengers’, presumably to subject them to further examination. The proposal has now lost its 
pertinence due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
15 but in December 2009 the 
European Council called upon the European Commission to reconsider the subject and propose 
another initiative setting up an EU Passenger Names Record system for the purpose of 
preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences and serious crime.
16 
Moreover, the EU is generously supporting technical research in the specific area of security-
related predictive data mining.
17  
3.  Who is affected? 
Profiling for security purposes can have an impact on the fundamental rights of anybody, 
potentially, as soon as he or she engages in the activity that is monitored, such as performing a 
financial transaction, or travelling by air, which are not normally unusual activities. As the data 
used is typically gathered by the private sector initially, individuals are not even required to be 
in direct contact with any representative of any authority whatsoever.  
Affected individuals can be classified in three main categories: 
a)  the entire population participating in the monitored activity: their personal data is collected, 
analysed, compared with obtained patterns, and stored for possible re-use;  
b)  those who mistakenly appear to match the profile as being worthy of further investigation:
18 
in addition to their personal data being processed as described, they are flagged as deserving 
‘more attention’ and thus subject to further investigation, unless and until it is made clear 
that they should not have been flagged; and 
c)  those who do match the profile: in addition to their personal data being processed as 
described, they are flagged as deserving ‘more attention’ and thus subject to further 
investigation. 
It is important to keep in mind that those who match the profile might be or not be the 
individuals explicitly targeted by the measure (the actual or potential ‘terrorists’, or the ‘money 
launderers’), and that they should not, in any case, be opposed as a category to the ‘innocent 
majority’: being flagged does not imply any statement about the innocence or guilt of the 
flagged individual.  
As currently applied in the security field, profiling appears to serve primarily as a filter. When 
used at the borders, for instance, it has been said to facilitate the segregation of ‘legitimate’ 
mobility from ‘illegitimate’ mobility,
19 or the separation of “people who are ordinary, happy, 
                                                      
15 Signed on 13 December 2007 by the 27 Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009. The Treaty signals the end 
of the adoption of Framework Decisions.  
16 Council of the European Union (2009), The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting the citizen, 2 December, p. 39.  
17 Notably through the projects INDECT (Intelligent information system supporting observation, 
searching and detection for security of citizens in an urban environment, http://www.indect-project.eu; 
SAMURAI (Suspicious and abnormal behaviour monitoring using a network of cameras for situation 
awareness enhancement, http://www.samurai-eu.org; and ADABTS, Automatic Detection of Abnormal 
Behaviour and Threats in crowded Spaces)  (Daniel Moeckli and James Thurman (2009), Survey of 
Counter-Terrorism Data Mining and Related Programmes, D08.1, 11 December, Detection 
Technologies, Terrorism, Ethics and Human Rights (DETECTER), pp. 30-31). 
18 Generally known as ‘false positives’. 
19 Louise Amoore (2006), “Biometrics borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror”, Political 
Geography, No. 25, p. 336. 5 
everyday travellers who are not meeting the profile of people who might be a risk”
20 from the 
others, maybe less ‘ordinary’, who happen to meet the profile. 
4.  Main problems and necessary safeguards 
Among the different rights dangerously threatened by security-related uses of profiling, the right 
to privacy
21 and the right to the protection of personal data
22 are particularly exposed.
23  
The processing of personal data of the entire population engaged in the monitored activity by 
itself represents an interference with their right to respect for private life. As such, this 
interference must comply with a series of requirements that ensure that it does not constitute a 
violation of the standards imposed by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Not 
only does the interference need to pursue a legitimate interest,
24 but it must also occur ‘in 
accordance with the law’, on the one hand, and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, on the 
other. 
As emphasised by the European Court of Human Rights in its case-law,
25 interferences can be 
considered to take place ‘in accordance with the law’ only if they meet minimum standards of 
transparency. The criteria determining the data to be processed must be clear, and those 
establishing how the data is used must be similarly precise and accessible. Transparency is, 
however, precisely one of the weakest facets of profiling practices in general.
26 How are profiles 
                                                      
20 Declaration of Ms Meg Hillier at the House of Lords (European Union Committee of the House of 
Lords (2008), The Passenger Name Record (PNR) Framework Decision, HL Paper 106, London, 
Evidence, p. 11). 
21 Or ‘right to respect for private life’, as enshrined in Art. 8 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and in Art. 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, 
pp. 1-16). 
22 Recognised as an autonomous fundamental right in Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, and affirmed also in Art. 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). 
23 The two rights are closely related, but different. See notably: De Hert, Paul and Serge Gutwirth (2006), 
“Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement: Opacity of the Individuals and Transparency of Power”, 
in Claes, E. A. Duff and S. Gutwirth (eds.), Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford, 
pp. 61-104.  
24 Such as in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, the 
prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
25 Of special interest in this sense is the judgement delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Liberty v. the United Kingdom case (Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, European Court of 
Human Rights, Application no. 58243/00, Judgement of 1 July 2008, hereafter ‘Liberty’). The case 
originated in an application against the United Kingdom (UK) and Northern Ireland lodged by a British 
and two Irish civil liberties’ organisations on 9 September 1999 concerning the implementation of the 
Interception of Communications Act of 1985. It concerned legislation allowing for the interception of 
communications between the UK and outside territory. In its judgement, the Court asserted that the law 
questioned did not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope or manner of exercise of the very wide 
discretion conferred on the State not only to intercept, but also to examine communications, as it did not 
set out in a form accessible to the public any indication of the procedure to be followed for the 
examination, sharing, storing and destroying of intercepted material (Liberty, § 69). 
26 For instance, in relation with behavioural advertising (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party and 
Working Party on Police and Justice (2009), The Future of Privacy: Joint contribution to the 
Consultation of the European Commission on the legal framework for the fundamental right to the 
protection of personal data, 1 December, Brussels, p. 16). ). See also, more generally, Gutwirth & 
Hildebrandt (2010), op. cit.: “Citizens whose data is being mined do not have the means to anticipate 6 
constructed, exactly? Who can influence the way in which they are developed and 
implemented? What precise data determine that an individual is judged as matching the profile? 
What kind of behaviour transforms an ‘uninteresting’ individual into an individual that is to be 
closely monitored? These questions rarely receive comprehensive and unambiguous answers. 
Thus, much remains to be achieved in this respect in order to ensure full compliance of profiling 
practices with the basic requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR.
27 
Interferences with the right to respect for private life can only be considered as ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’, and thus not in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, if they are proportionate 
in the light of the interest pursued.
28 For this evaluation, an important lesson was provided by a 
landmark judgement delivered by the German Constitutional Court in 2006.
29 The ruling 
concerned a ‘fishing net’ initiative, so-called Rasterfahndung, aimed at identifying ‘sleeper’ 
members of terrorist organisations. The initiative foresaw the screening of data from public and 
private sources in order to track individuals matching a set of characteristics believed to 
correspond to the persons sought (such as being male, Muslim, or a student). The German 
Constitutional Court ruled that such a measure was in breach of the German fundamental right 
of informational self-determination, and that it could only be justified in the face of a concrete 
danger to highly valued legal interests. But modern profiling practices are significantly more 
invasive than any ‘fishing net’ measures, as even before any data is processed with the aim of 
selecting individuals matching certain features, massive quantities of data are collected and 
analysed in order to discern the features in question.
30 Thus, for them to be ‘proportionate’ and 
‘necessary’, the grounds justifying their adoption should be particularly solid. 
The processing of personal data in the context of profiling also has to meet the demands derived 
from the fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Therefore, the deployment of a 
satisfactory data protection regime is capital.
31 Various complex issues need careful 
consideration in this regard, such as, for instance, the problems derived from the mismatch 
between the aims officially pursued with a specific profiling activity and the actual significance 
and consequences of being flagged. 
                                                                                                                                                           
what the algorithms will come up with and hence they do not have a clue what knowledge about them 
exists, how they are categorised and evaluated, and what effects and consequences this entails. For 
individual citizens to regain some control, access is needed to the profiles applied to them and/or 
information about how these profiles may affect them” (p. 5 of current manuscript). 
27 For example, the profiling of air passengers as discussed at EU level appears, worryingly, to lack 
clarity on the procedure used for the filtering of individuals (in this sense, see: European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) (2007), Opinion on the draft Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use 
of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, 20 December, Brussels, p. 5). 
28 Questioning the proportionality of the 2007 proposal of the European Commission for a EU PNR 
system, see: European Parliament (2008), Resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a Council 
framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, 
P6_TA(2008)0561, Strasbourg.  
29 Decision of German Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006, Absatz-Nr. (1-184). 
30 The extraordinarily invasive nature of profiling through predictive data mining makes it particularly 
difficult to support the wide implementation of ‘behavioural profiling’ as the solution to (certainly also 
problematic) ethnic profiling (with a different perspective, see: European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) (2008), Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law 
enforcement purposes, 28 October.  
31 On the unsatisfactory nature of the data protection regime applicable to the processing related to the 
2007 proposal of the European Commission for a EU PNR system, see: Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party and Working Party on Police and Justice (2007), Joint opinion on the proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement 
purposes, WP 145, WPPJ 01:07, December. 7 
This problem is particularly acute with regard to national provisions implementing Directive 
2005/60/EC. This Directive, as explained, is directed towards the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing. The patterns on which the system relies, however, are to be 
regarded as merely indicative and, when a transaction is flagged, this simply suggests that 
further investigation may be warranted.
32 Transactions flagged as ‘suspicious’ are possibly 
related to money laundering or terrorist financing, but in most cases they won’t be. The trouble 
with this that since it occurs in the context of counterterrorism; national provisions 
implementing those of Directive 2005/60/EC tend to extend to the processing leading to any 
flagging of transactions (and subsequently thereof); a series of restrictions on the right to 
personal data,
33 and in particular limitations on the right to access,
34 which are usually applied in 
the area of counterterrorism to make sure that the individuals placed under surveillance are not 
aware of this fact. In practice, any citizen can display conduct that will be considered as risky 
conduct, and thus flagged and reported to the relevant authorities, but they will not be granted 
the possibility to contest such an assessment
35 even if this limitation will, in most cases, be 
unfounded, and thus contrary to fundamental rights requirements.
36  
From a regulatory perspective, profiling has often been addressed through the notion of 
‘automated decisions’.
37 For those who happen to be flagged, it is certainly crucial that no 
decision with a negative effect is taken without further verification, and such assessment should 
normally include the intervention of at least a human being, and, depending on the 
consequences of the decision, a particularly qualified person, such as a judge. When profiling 
                                                      
32 National Research Council of the National Academies (2008), Protecting Individual Privacy in the 
Struggle Against Terrorist: A Framework for Program Assessment, National Academy of Sciences, 
Washington, D.C., pp. 78-79. 
33 In some member states, a special regime will be applicable to the files of law enforcement authorities to 
be used for law enforcement purposes, for which important exceptions are foreseen, limiting the right to 
data protection of those affected by the processing (Solanes Corella, Ángeles and María Belén Cardona 
Rubert (2005), Protección de datos personales y derechos de los extranjeros inmigrantes, Valencia: 
Tirant Lo Blanch, p. 75). 
34 Which is a core element of the right to the protection of personal data (College van burgemeester en 
wethouders van Rotterdam v. M.E.E. Rijkeboer, Case C-553/07, Judgement of the European Court of 
Justice of 7 May 2009, § 49). It should be noted that the restrictions are de facto extended to data 
processing carried out by private actors.  
35 In the UK, for instance, individuals wishing to make use of their right to access the data related to them 
stored in the database storing all ‘suspicious activity reports’ are unlikely to succeed because of 
exemptions foreseen in data protection provisions in relation to national security and crime (European 
Union Committee of the House of Lords (2009), Money laundering and the financing of terrorism, House 
of Lords, HL Paper 132, 22 July, London, p. 49). 
36 Any limitations to the fundamental right to personal data should be granted restrictively, for the 
minimum period necessary. During this time, moreover, the relevant data protection supervisory 
authority, or the courts, should be granted powers compensating for the limitation of the right of the data 
subject (Llaneza, Paloma (2007), “El derecho de acceso a los datos de carácter personal contenidos en los 
ficheros relativos a la prevención del blanqueo de capitales”, Revista Española de Protección de Datos, 
No. 3, p. 276). 
37 See, for instance, Art. 7 of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Official Journal of the European Union, L 350, 
30.12.2008, p. 60–71). Also, more generally, Serge Gutwirth and Paul De Hert (2008), op. cit., pp. 271-
291.  8 
practices are deployed massively, other measures need to be considered, including effective 
redress and compensation for those who are flagged erroneously.
38 
In any case, it needs to be highlighted that, through profiling practices, a series of features or 
conducts, which by themselves are fully legitimate and fall with the area of an individual’s 
freedom, are transformed into signs pertaining to a pre-defined mistrusted category. Thus, forms 
of behaviour that are per se not only innocent, but also constitutionally protected, are obliquely 
transformed into indications of criminal activity,
39 or at least of undesirability. This requires 
major reflection, both from a legal (notably in relation with the right to non-discrimination) and 
an ethical perspective. 
5. Concluding  remarks 
The idea of obtaining useful knowledge by automatically processing massive quantities of 
otherwise apparently incoherent, seemingly insignificant, ‘silent’ data can understandably hold 
some fascination for policy-makers. Profiling techniques are being constantly improved and 
refined to reinforce the impression that this kind of learning is easily obtainable and that it can 
be valuable. This paper has not considered whether applying profiling for security purposes is a 
genuinely effective choice, although that is, in itself, a highly debatable issue.
40 
What has been emphasised is that it is a risky practice, which generates numerous dangers for 
the rights and freedoms of individuals – not only for a targeted minority, and for those 
accidentally caught up in the flagging process, but also for the whole population that is de facto 
placed under generalised surveillance.
41 Safeguards are urgently needed, and they should be 
discussed in an open, informed debate, which must take into account the very nature of 
profiling. At the moment, it would appear that no such debate is taking place. 
                                                      
38 On this subject, see Gloria González Fuster and Paul De Hert (2007), “PNR and compensation”, in 
Juliet Lodge (ed.) (2007), Are You Who You Say You Are? The EU and Biometric Borders, Nijmegen: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, pp. 101-109. 
39 Rigaux (1990), op. cit., p. 431. 
40 Calling for an EU-supported study on the effectiveness of profiling, see, for instance: European 
Parliament (2009), Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on 
the problem of profiling, notably on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counter-terrorism, law 
enforcement, immigration, customs and border control, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs, Rapporteur: Sarah Ludford, 3 April.  
41 Profiling practices are not the only initiatives currently being discussed and developed that entail such 
monitoring. For instance, these include so-called ‘three strikes’ internet disconnection policies that are 
being implemented in some member states and rely on the generalised monitoring of all internet activities 
of all internet users (European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) (2010), Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the current negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA), 22 February, Brussels, p. 4). See also Sari Depreeuw and Serge Gutwirth 
(2010), “Bescherming van intellectuele rechten mag niet ten koste van privacy”, Juristenkrant, 14 april, 
p. 12.  9 
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